Andreas Oberheitmann:COMMON, BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY

2014-03-06 14:47:55 来源: 作者: 【大中小】浏览:2528次评论:0条

共同但有区别责任原则在后京都议定书时代人均温室气体排放权的适用
欧安德

共同但有区别责任原则是可持续发展的基础。其作为国际环境法原则首现于1992年于巴西里约热内卢举行的联合国环境与发展大会。该原则的本源为载于联合国气候变化框架公约及京都议定书的公平原则。该原则的主要内容包括共同的责任以及有区别的责任两点。本文拟就该原则在后京都议定书时代，于人均温室气体排放权方面的适用进行研究探讨。

COMMON, BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY IN A
POST KYOTO REGIME BASED ON CUMULATIVE
PER CAPITA GHG-EMISSION rights

Andreas Oberheitmann+
The principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibility" (CBDR) is one of the cornerstones of sustainable development. It has emerged as a principle of International Environmental Law and has been explicitly formulated in the context of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. This principle finds its origins in equity considerations and equity principles in international law and informs in particular the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (The Encyclopedia of Earth, 2007).
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration provides the first formulation of the CBDR. It states: "In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command."
Thus, the CBDR has two focal points:

Common responsibility. It arises from the concept of common heritage and common concern of humankind, and reflects the duty of States of equally sharing the burden of environmental protection for common resources.
Differentiated responsibility. It addresses substantive equality in the different framework conditions of the single countries: unequal material, social and economic situations across States; different historical contributions to global environmental problems; and financial, technological and structural capacity to tackle those global problems. In this sense the principle establishes a conceptual framework for an equitable allocation of the costs of global environmental protection (The Encyclopedia of Earth, 2007).

Particularly important is the relationship that the CBDR establishes between the past economic exploitation of global commons and the responsibility to carry out actions that remedy or mitigate the consequences of such exploitation. It anchors responsibility on past harm done, or culpability. Prior to Rio differentiated responsibilities were based on different capabilities and needs were often recognized in International Agreements through differential treatment provisions. The novelty of the CBDR is the emergence of the historical responsibility dimension. The practical consequences of the CBDR are that differential obligations are imposed on the parties to a Multilateral Environmental Agreement. The prime example is the Kyoto Protocol, where only countries listed in Annex I (developed countries and countries with economy in transition) have quantified emissions reduction obligations under the agreement. Additionally, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol establish general obligations of cooperation towards technology transfer, and provide for financial assistance for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The GEF operates two funds under the UNFCCC, the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund; it also operates the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund. These are all mechanisms aimed at operationalizing the CBDR. The preamble of the UNFCCC acknowledges "that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions". Article 3(1) of the Convention adds the leadership role that developed countries should take, and after reaffirming the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, it states that "the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof." (The Encyclopedia of Earth, 2007).
For the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012, different successor regimes have been discussed. The 15^thConference of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009 failed to sign such a new agreement. Only in 2011, on COP17 in Durban, the Parties finally agreed to a legally binding obligation by all countries, which will be prepared by 2015, and shall take effect in 2020. The form of this new post Kyoto regime, however, is still open.
In order to understand the Kyoto process, Section 1 gives an introduction into the fundamentals of the Kyoto Protocol and China’s role in this international agreement. Section 2 discusses the most important currently discussed proposals for a post-Kyoto climate regime.
Different approaches are being discussed and had been compiled and analysed by different authors. CNRS/LEPII-EPE (2003) compiled and contrasted different post Kyoto approaches such as “per capita convergence”, “soft landing”, the “Brazilian proposal”, “ability to pay” etc. The “Per Capita Convergence” is seen as having advantages being a simple concept which allows for a full emission trading. Due to their research, this concept may be improved through the inclusion of adjustment factors, the adjustment of the convergence year etc. Russa and Criquib (2007) proposed a “soft-landing scheme” allowing for a smooth transition of developing countries to green economies. They do not touch per-capita emissions. During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the delegation of Brazil presented an approach for the allocation of emission reduction obligations among Annex-I Parties based on the effect of their cumulative historical emissions from 1840 on the global average surface temperature (UNFCCC, 1997). The Brazilian proposal was not adopted that time but did receive support, especially from developing countries. TheProject Team of Development Research Center of the State Council of China (2009) proposed a regime based on cumulative emissions similar to the Brazilian approach for all countries, but also not on a per capita basis: For 2050 every country shall receive an absolute emission budget. How it is kept, is left to the single countries.
Den Elzen, Lucas and Vuuren (2005) analysed the abatement costs of three post-Kyoto regimes for differentiating commitments compatible with stabilising atmospheric greenhouse gases concentrations at 550 ppm CO₂equivalent in 2100. The three regimes explored are: (1) the “multi-stage approach” assumes a gradual increase in the number of Parties involved who are adopting either emission intensity or reductions targets; (2) the “Brazilian proposal” (UNFCCC, 1997), i.e. the allocation or reductions based on countries’ contribution to temperature increase; (3) “contraction and convergence”, with full participation in convergence of per capita emission allowances. The distribution of costs for the “contraction and convergence” approach highly depends on the convergence year. The “multi-stage approach” and “contraction and convergence” (convergence year 2050) seem to result in relatively the most even distribution of costs amongst all Parties. The “Brazilian proposal” brings about the highest costs for the Annex-I countries, Middle East and Latin America. Tickell (2008) analyses the “contraction and convergence” approach. As to his understanding, this approach has the advantage that it reflects (a) the need for a firm, global cap on GHG emissions without which such greenhouse gas emissions are likely to carry on rising, and (b) the equity principle inherent in “contraction and convergence”, that the right to emit GHGs is a common right of humanity.
These approaches have a common weakness: They at the same time (a)do not acknowledge the historical responsibilities of the industrialized countries for the historical greenhouse gas emissions and the responsibility of developing countries for a large fraction of the current future emissions, and (b) do not provide for a fair distribution of emission rights. Hence, they are not in line with the principle of "Common, but Differentiated Responsibilities".
Section 3 proposes such a post Kyoto climate regime based on per capita cumulated greenhouse gas emissions taking these weaknesses into account. Section 4 summarizes the paper.

1. China’s role in the current Kyoto regime based on the principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities"

Chinais one of the signees of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Brazil in June 1992. China ratified the Convention in December 1992. In 1997, the third Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC in Kyoto, Japan, lead to an agreement of the countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC (Annex-I countries), i.e. the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries and the countries in economic transformation in middle and eastern Europe to reduce the emissions of the six most important greenhouse gases (CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF₆) between 2008 and 2012 on the average by 5.2% against the baseline on 1990[1]. The Kyoto Protocol came into force on 16 February 2005 after its ratification by 55 countries representing more than 55% of the CO₂-Emissions of the Annex-I countries. China signed the Kyoto Protocol on 29 May 1998, and formally ratified the Protocol on 30 August 2002.
In accordance with the principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" enshrined in the Convention, as a Non-Annex-I country, China does not have quantitative emission reduction obligations towards the Kyoto Protocol, it only has to report its emissions in a national communication describing the steps they are taking or envisage undertaking to implement the Convention (Articles 4.1 and 12). Also, according to CBDR, the required contents of these national communications and the timetable for their submission is different for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties (all other than Annex-I countries). Each non-Annex I Party shall submit its initial communication within three years of the entry into force of the Convention for that Party, or of the availability of financial resources.
On 10 December 2004, China submitted its initial National Communication to the Conference of the Parties. It covers the following issues: (a) National circumstances; (b) National greenhouse gas inventory; (c) Impacts of climate change and adaptation; (d) Policies and measures related to climate change mitigation; (e) Research and systematic observation; (f) Education, training and public awareness, and (g) Needs for funds, technologies and capacity building (The People’s Republic of China, 2004).
The institutional setting in China is as such: In 1990, a Coordination Committee for climate change issues was established under the Environmental Protection Committee of the State Council being the institution in charge of environmental policy at that time. In 1998, when central government organizations were streamlined, the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC)[2]was set up. The National Coordination Committee on Climate Change is an inter-ministerial body and is responsible for deliberation and coordination on climate related policy issues and activities, negotiations with foreign parties. Major issues are submitted to the State Council for directions and guidance. In the past few years, the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change provided guidance to central government departments and local governments for their addressing climate change issues. Currently, the division of work of the National Coordination Group is as follows:

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) coordinates climate change policies and actions adopted by various departments;
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the lead for participating in international climate change negotiations;
The State Meteorological Administration takes the lead for participating in the work of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

The Office of the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change is located in Department of Regional Economy of NDRC and responsible for the routine work of the Committee. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MOEP) is not a formal member of the NCCCC, However, a representative of MOEP is on of the Vice Chairmen (China Climate Change Info-net, 2009). The division of political responsibility is as such: the MOEP is responsible for the local and regional emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions are basically dealt with by NDRC and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST).
As a developing country, according to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, China and other developing countries (Non-Annex I countries) can host projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which aims at supporting the developing to achieve a sustainable development through environmentally friendly technology transfer and at the same time help the industrialised countries via these investments in greenhouse gas mitigation technology to fulfil their quantitative obligations more flexible[3]. Preconditions for the participation on CDM projects (Art, 12,5) are: (a) voluntary participation approved by each Party involved, (b) real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change; and (c) reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.
Chinaand India are the major players in the CDM-market. By 29 October 2012, in terms of expected annual Certified Emission Reduction (CER) certificates from projects registered at UNFCCC, China is the biggest host country with 617.9 Mill. t CO_2eqper year or 60.0% of worldwide CERs, followed by India with 151.3 Mill. t CO_2eqper year or 14.7% (UNFCCC, 2012).

2. Current options of a new post-Kyoto regime

The current Kyoto climate regime has to be re-acknowledged or succeeded by another climate regime by 2015 being effective in 2020. Currently, there are different main approaches to the future climate architecture discussed (Table 1):
Table 1:
Overview of main current approaches for a post Kyotoregime

• Per Capita Convergence in emission endowments
This approach, based mainly on the egalitarian principle, has been developed into a dynamic perspective by defining emission endowments based on convergence of per capita emissions under a contracting global greenhouse gas emission profile. In such a convergence regime, all countries participate in the climate regime with emission quotas converging to equal per capita levels at a chosen date in the future.
• Soft Landing in emission growth
Aiming principally at reaching a global target while limiting the constraint imposed on each world region, this approach proposes progressively stabilising emissions in developing countries, with the timing of the reduction of current emission growth rates based on per capita emission and income levels. For Annex-I countries, continued emission reductions are required, according to an ‘extended Kyoto’ trend.
• Global Preference Score approach
This scheme defines a mixed indicator for endowment that combines a grandfathering entitlement method and a per capita approach. A 'Preference Score Share' is calculated by adding the relative emission shares of each obtained using the two methods by country, weighted by the share of world population assumed to prefer the first or second approach (basically Annex I countries versus non- Annex I countries).
• Historical Contribution to Climate Change or ‘Brazilian proposal’
During the negotiations on the Kyoto protocol, Brazil made a proposal to link the relative contribution of industrialised parties to their relative contribution to the global mean temperature rise, based on the responsibility principle.
• Ability To Pay
This principle was developed as a scheme to progressively integrate non-Annex I countries into a system of global emission reductions with an initial per capita GDP threshold, and subsequent levels of reduction to meet long-term climate targets basically depending on each country’s per capita GDP.
• Multi-Stage approach
The Multi-Stage approaches divide countries into different groups, with different levels of responsibility or types of commitment (stages). The number of countries involved and their level of commitment gradually increase over time, according to pre-defined participation rules.

Source: CNRS/LEPII-EPE (2003).

Following CNRS/LEPII-EPE (2003), the international architecture of a post Kyoto regime may evolve in two different directions:

A set of rules or targets that define how all Parties’ emission quotas develop over a long period (a ‘full participation’ regime).
An incremental but rule-based approach to extending the climate regime, with a gradual expansion of the Annex I group of countries adopting binding quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives, whether absolute or dynamic (an ‘increasing participation’ or ‘multi-stage’ regime).

According to this distinction, the “per capita convergence”, the “soft landing” and the “global preference score” approaches belong to the first type of architecture, while the “Brazilian proposal”, “ability to pay” or “multi-stage” approaches belong to the second (CNRS/LEPII-EPE 2003). Without going too much into detail on every approach, these concepts vary considerably concerning their instruments. Due to these differences, they all have their specific strengths, weaknesses and possible remedies (Table 2).
Table 2:
Strengths, weaknesses and possible remedies of different post Kyotoapproaches

	Strengths	Weaknesses	Possible remedies
Per capitaconvergence inemission endowments	Simple concept Allows for full emission trading	Possible implementation problems for developing countries Possible surplus emissions Could lead to largereductions for some countries	Include adjustment factors Adjust convergence year Limit the use of emission trading Allow for regional PerCapita Convergenceapproaches with internal redistribution
Soft Landing in emission growth	Smooth transition Allows for full emission trading	No direct relation to equity principles Possible implementation problems for developing countries No specification of reduction stage	Introduce a participation threshold Define a reduction stage
*Global Preference Score Approach*	Simple concept Allows for full emission trading Funds for less developed countries	Extreme results Extra costs for Annex I / middle-income developing countries Possible implementation problems developing countries Non-compatible with UNFCCC	Extend policy delay / include adjustment period • Give more weight to emissions than population in voting Include adjustment factors
Historical contribution to Climate Change	Acceptance by developing countries very likely Formal status under UNFCCC	Focus on responsibility only Extreme results Relatively complex approach Inflexible (in original form)	Use other responsibilityindicator (e.g. cumulative emissions from 1950 or 1990)
Ability to pay	Results in a balanced distribution of costs	Based on capability only Abstract parameters	Simplify approach
Multi-stage approach	Covers different equity principles Flexible concept offering room for negotiation Compatible with Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC	Many parameters Intensity targets reducecertainty aboutenvironmentaleffectiveness andcomplicate implementation	Limit number of stages Dual targets concept Ex-post trading for developing countries with intensity targets Use other burden sharingschemes than per capita emissions
Source: CNRS/LEPII-EPE (2003), Tickell(2008).

As one of the latest developments in this discussion, in March 2009, a research group of the State Council Development Research Center published an article in the Chinese “Economic Research Journal” and proposed a regime with cumulative emissions similar to the Brazilian approach, but also not on a per capita basis: For 2050, every country shall receive an absolute emission budget. How it is kept, is left to the single countries. Excess emission rights can be traded (Project Team of Development Research Center of the State Council of China, 2009). The main weakness of all the approaches listed above, however, is that

they do not take into the fact into consideration, that on the one side, the developed countries are responsible for the current CO₂-concentration in the atmosphere, on the other side developing countries such as China and India are to a large extent responsible for the current additional CO₂-emissions which now start to accumulate in the atmosphere (which is partly done in the “Brazilian proposal”), and
do not provide for a fair distribution of emission rights like in “per capita convergence in emission endowments” (which is done in per-capita approaches, but without the historical emissions).

Against this background, in this article, a new approach is presented taking into account the weaknesses of the other single concepts and in a way combining the “per capita convergence” and the “Brazilian proposal”: a climate regime based on per-capita cumulative CO₂-emission rights to reach the 2°C target or a 400 ppm (450 ppm) concentration of CO₂inthe atmosphere based on CO₂-emissions between 1750 and 2007 (Oberheitmann, 2010). The main difference to the Brazilian approach is that it is based on a per-capita distribution of CO₂-emissions rights based on a fixed year for the population rather than an absolute budget and takes into account a longer time period starting in 1750 rather then 1840.
The approach presented in this paper was firstly presented on an international conference in Münster, Germany in June 2009 and developed independently from the budget approach by the German Advisory Council on Climate Change published in July 2009 (WBGU, 2009). The allocation scheme presented here differs from WBGU (2009) as it comprises the cumulative emissions from 1750 on. WGBU (2009) only cumulates the remaining budget from 1990 to 2050 resp. 2010 to 2050 to achieve the global 2° C goal. To fully comply with the UNFCCC principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", the historical emissions of the Annex-I countries also have to be taken into account for a new post Kyoto regime as undertaken in the approach presented in this article.

3. Common, but differentiated responsibilities in a climate regime based on per-capita cumulative emission rights to reach the 2°Ctarget

Against the background of the weaknesses states above, in this article, an alternative approach is presented taking into account the weaknesses of the other single concepts and in a way combining the “per capita convergence in emission endowments” and the “Brazilian proposal”: a climate regime based on per-capita cumulative emission rights to reach the 2°C target or a 400 ppm (450 ppm) concentration of CO₂inthe atmosphere (Oberheitmann, 2010).
In the newly proposed post Kyoto regime, the cumulated world CO₂-emissions (in Mill. t) in year n are defined as (Equation 1):

(1)

consisting of the cumulated CO₂-emissions from primary fossil energy consumption plus emission from bunkers (ships and airplanes)[1](CO_2,bunker), the flaring of gas (CO_2,flagas) and in cement production (CO_2,cement) reduced by the natural absorption of the anthropogenic CO₂-emissions of 1000 years ago (CO_{2WORLD,t-1000}). In reality, very small parts of the emissions are absorbed every year. Most of the CO₂remains in the atmosphere for thousand years, however. These emission absorptions had, in fact, been zero (Oberheitmann, 2010). Table 3 shows the development of the cumulated CO₂-emissions in the world.
Table 3:
Development of cumulated CO₂-emissions in the world
(1750-2007, in Mill. t)

Year	Africa	AsiaPacific	China	India	Middle East	Central & South America	North America	Europe and Eurasia	World	OECD	Annex-I countries	Non-Annex-I countries
1750	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	9	9	0
1850	39	0	0	0	0	0	191	4593	4823	4784	4784	39
1900	71	267	0	126	0	30	11008	33546	44921	42961	44673	249
1950	1855	6999	1881	2314	456	1560	96437	118329	225636	201018	216088	9548
1960	3248	14606	5114	3234	1052	3860	126344	153232	302343	255956	282963	19380
1970	5489	32009	11536	5087	3335	7510	168560	210667	427571	339628	388523	39047
1980	9680	66338	24937	7966	8224	13188	226306	292777	616513	458162	539378	77134
1990	16432	115454	46293	13096	14790	20286	286255	381809	835025	580732	699614	135412
2000	24666	192694	81003	21921	24926	29507	355771	458320	1085884	717616	855785	230098
2005	29729	244025	105632	27664	31846	34903	393785	495962	1230250	791878	936768	293482
2006	30827	256623	112411	29001	33466	36091	401478	503850	1262334	807051	953364	308970
2007	31973	269930	119696	30431	35130	37349	409303	512900	1296586	822329	970034	326552
Source: Ober.heitmann (2010).

Calculating the cumulative CO₂-emissions as a proxy for the CO₂-concentration in the atmosphere (Table 4), a concentration of 400 ppm CO₂represents about 1600 bn. t cumulated CO₂-emissions (CO_2,cum), 450 ppm about 2300 bn. t CO_2,cum. In 2007, the Annex-I countries represent 74.8% of the world cumulative CO₂-emissions, the OECD countries 63.4%. The Non-Annex-I countries are only responsible for 25.2% of the cumulated emissions, of which China represents 9.2%. In 2007, with 119.7 bn CO_2,cum, China, already almost exceeded the cumulative CO₂-emissions of Germany (85.1 bn t CO_2,cum) and France (35.5 bn t CO_2,cum) together. Taking the 2007 world population (6552 Mill.) as the constant reference over time, every human being on Earth would have emission rights of 247 t CO_2,cumfor the 400 ppm concentration and 355 CO_2,cumfor a 450 ppm concentration in the atmosphere. Table 4 shows the cumulative CO₂-emission consumption per capita worldwide and by selected countries.

Table 4:
Development of cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita in the world
(1950-2007)

Country	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007
Africa	10	13	15	20	27	31	33	34	34
AsiaPacific	5	9	16	27	40	57	69	71	74
China	4	8	14	25	40	64	81	86	91
India	6	7	10	12	16	21	25	26	27
Japan	1	19	68	151	230	329	382	393	405
Middle East	14	22	51	89	114	147	168	172	177
Central & South America	11	22	33	46	57	71	78	79	81
Europe and Eurasia	178	207	258	368	453	529	567	575	584
Germany	431	504	596	738	888	956	1012	1023	1035
North America	484	525	598	702	793	879	911	920	929
USA	580	639	751	908	1048	1172	1199	1207	1218
World	89	100	116	139	160	180	192	195	198
OECD	293	329	387	473	557	630	670	679	688
Annex-I countries	251	289	357	455	553	674	720	730	740
Non-Annex-I countries	6	10	15	24	34	48	58	60	62
Source: Ober.heitmann(2010).

Taking the about 247 t CO_2,cumper capita (400 ppm) resp. 355 t CO_2,cumper capita (450 ppm) as a yardstick, it is quite obvious that the industrialized countries have exceeded their emission budget per capita by far. In 2007, the US citizens consumed 1218 t CO_2,cumper capita, the Germans 1035 CO_2,cumper capita, far above the average of the OECD average (688 CO_2,cumper capita). In 2007, China only consumed 91 t CO_2,cumper capita. Although the responsibility for mitigation of climate change is a national obligation, there might be significant differences between states and the nation. E.g. in the U.S. states such as California are much more advanced in their climate change mitigation policies than the U.S. as a country in total.
In the approach presented in this article, a growing population over time, however, should not lead to an increase of the total emission budget of a country, but on the contrary to an incentive to increase energy efficiency, the promotion of renewable energy sources or possibly adopt a pro-active population growth policy (this, however, can be ethically questionable). Hence, after 2007, the CO₂-emissions per capita for each country (m) will be calculated according to Equation 2:

(2)
Table 5 shows the development of cumulated CO₂-emissions in the world in different scenarios of economic growth (OBERHEITMANN, 2010). In the business as usual scenario (BAU) cumulated CO₂-emissions worldwide reach about 3290 bn. tons of CO₂in2050. These cumulated CO₂-emissions represent a CO₂-concentration in the atmosphere of 519 ppm. China takes a share of 23.4% of cumulated world emissions.

Table 5:
Development of cumulated CO₂-emissions in the world
(2010-2050, in bn. t CO_2,cum)

Country	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050	Percent of World (2050)
	BAU
Africa	40	50	60	70	80	2.4
AsiaPacific	310	480	700	950	1250	38.0
China	140	240	380	560	770	23.4
India	40	50	70	100	130	4.0
Japan	60	70	90	100	110	3.3
Middle East	40	60	80	100	120	3.6
Central & South America	40	50	60	80	90	2.7
Europe and Eurasia	540	630	730	840	950	28.9
Germany	90	100	110	120	130	4.0
North America	430	520	610	700	800	24.3
USA	390	470	540	630	710	21.6
World	1400	1790	2240	2740	3290	100.0
OECD	870	1040	1210	1390	1570	47.7
Annex-I countries	1020	1210	1410	1610	1820	55.3
Non-Annex-I countries	380	580	830	1130	1470	44.7
	HIGH
Africa	40	50	60	70	80	2.3
AsiaPacific	310	490	720	1010	1380	39.9
China	140	250	400	600	880	25.4
India	40	50	80	100	130	3.8
Japan	60	70	90	100	120	3.5
Middle East	40	60	80	100	130	3.8
Central & South America	40	50	60	80	90	2.6
Europe and Eurasia	540	630	740	850	980	28.3
Germany	90	100	110	120	130	3.8
North America	430	520	610	710	810	23.4
USA	390	470	550	630	720	20.8
World	1400	1800	2260	2820	3460	100.0
OECD	870	1040	1210	1400	1590	46.0
Annex-I countries	1020	1210	1410	1630	1850	53.5
Non-Annex-I countries	380	580	850	1190	1610	46.5
	LOW
Africa	40	50	60	70	80	2.6
AsiaPacific	310	470	660	870	1100	35.6
China	140	240	350	490	650	21.0
India	40	50	70	90	120	3.9
Japan	60	70	90	100	110	3.6
Middle East	40	60	80	100	120	3.9
Central & South America	40	50	60	80	90	2.9
Europe and Eurasia	540	630	730	820	930	30.1
Germany	90	100	110	120	130	4.2
North America	430	520	610	700	780	25.2
USA	390	460	540	620	700	22.7
World	1400	1780	2190	2630	3090	100.0
OECD	870	1030	1200	1370	1540	49.8
Annex-I countries	1020	1210	1400	1590	1790	57.9
Non-Annex-I countries	380	570	790	1040	1310	42.4
Source: Ober.heitmann(2010).

In the HIGH-scenario, cumulated worldwide CO₂-emissions even reach about 3460 bn t CO_2,cum, a concentration of about 530 ppm. China’s emissions represent a 25.4% share. The LOW-scenario provides for cumulated worldwide CO₂-emissions of only about 3100 bn t CO_2,cum, a concentration of about 500 ppm. China’s share is about 21.0% of world emissions (Table 5).
Finally, Table 6 shows the development of cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita in the world, calculated on the 2007 population. To better compare it with the 400 ppm, resp. 450 ppm thresholds, these two figures are highlighted.

Table 6:
Development of cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita¹inthe world
(2010-2050, in t CO_2,cum)

	BAU
	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Africa	38	49	61	73	84
AsiaPacific	86	133	191	263	344
China	109	185	289	422	582
India	31	47	66	88	112
Japan	439	556	673	788	897
Middle East	200	287	387	497	617
Central & South America	88	113	139	165	192
Europe and Eurasia	614	720	835	959	1088
Germany	1070	1188	1309	1432	1556
North America	985	1180	1385	1596	1809
USA	1290	1537	1798	2068	2343
World	214	273	341	419	502
OECD	728	866	1011	1160	1309
Annex-I countries	781	924	1074	1231	280
Non-Annex-I countries	72	111	158	216	86
400 ppm	247	247	247	247	247
450 ppm	355	355	355	355	355
	HIGH
Africa	38	50	62	74	86
AsiaPacific	86	134	197	278	380
China	109	188	300	457	665
India	31	47	67	91	119
Japan	439	557	676	796	912
Middle East	200	289	391	507	634
Central & South America	88	113	140	167	194
Europe and Eurasia	614	721	840	971	1114
Germany	1070	1189	1310	1434	1560
North America	985	1182	1389	1606	1829
USA	1290	1539	1803	2081	2368
World	214	274	346	430	528
OECD	728	867	1015	1169	1327
Annex-I countries	782	925	1079	1242	1413
Non-Annex-I countries	72	112	162	227	307
400 ppm	247	247	247	247	247
450 ppm	355	355	355	355	355
	LOW
Africa	38	49	61	71	82
AsiaPacific	86	130	182	239	303
China	109	180	268	372	490
India	31	46	64	84	104
Japan	439	553	667	775	876
Middle East	200	285	379	482	593
Central & South America	88	112	137	163	188
Europe and Eurasia	614	717	826	940	1057
Germany	1070	1188	1308	1429	1551
North America	985	1177	1376	1578	1781
USA	1290	1534	1786	2045	2308
World	214	271	334	401	472
OECD	728	864	1003	1145	1286
Annex-I countries	781	921	1066	1213	1363
Non-Annex-I countries	72	109	151	198	250
400 ppm	247	247	247	247	247
450 ppm	355	355	355	355	355
Source: Ober.heitmann(2010). 1) 2007 population.

Depending on the economic growth in the different growth scenarios, the distribution of per capita cumulated emission rights according to the principle of "Common, but Differentiated Responsibilities" would be as follows:

In the BAU-scenario, worldwide, the 400 ppm threshold is reached by 2015, the 450 ppm threshold by 2031. According to the simulations, China has to stabilise its cumulative CO₂-emissions on the 2026 level (400 ppm) resp. 2035 (450 ppm). On the average, all Non-Annex-I countries will reach this target by 2045. In the HIGH scenario of economic growth, China will reach the 400 ppm threshold by 2025, the 450 ppm threshold by 2034 (worldwide: 400 ppm by 2015, 450 ppm by 2031). In the LOW-scnenario, worldwide, 400 ppm will be reached by 2016, 450 ppm by 2033. China’s cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita will reach the 247 t CO_2,cumlevel (400 ppm) by 2028, the 355 t CO_2,cumlevel (450 ppm) by 2038 (Table 11).
The Annex-I countries, however, on the average would have to reduce their cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita to their 1950 level instead of facing a further increase. In 2007, that would have meant to reduce per-capita cumulated emissions from 740 t CO_2,cumby 493 t CO_2,cumto 247 t CO_2,cum. Multiplied with the 2007 Annex-I country population (1.310 bn.),this resulted in a CO₂-emission reduction commitment of 646.2 bn t CO_2,cum, down to the 400 ppm level, resp. 505.1 bn t CO_2,cum, down to the 450 ppm level, provided, there were be no new CO₂-emissions after 2007. As additional CO₂after 2007 had been emitted up to now and CO₂-emissions into the atmosphere will certainly occur, because an economy cannot switch to a zero carbon path from one year to another, incremental CO₂-emissions after 2008 have to be taken into account.

Table 7 shows the emission reduction target and subsequent mitigation costs for the Annex-I countries in the three economic growth scenarios and the 400 ppm resp. 450 ppm CO₂-concentration caps for the start of the mitigation measures in 2010 and 2020.
Table 7:
Emission reduction target and costs for the Annex-I countries in different economic growth scenarios and CO₂-concentration caps up to 2050
(2010 and 2020, in bn. t CO_2,,cumand US$)

	400 ppm
	Reduction target (bn. t CO_2,cum)			Reduction costs (trillion US$)			Reduction costs per capita (US$)
Start of reduction measures	BAU	HIGH	LOW	BAU	HIGH	LOW	BAU	HIGH	LOW
2010	681.9	682.0	681.8	34.1	34.1	34.1	26000	26000	26000
2020^a⁾	867.2	868.7	864.2	37.9	38.0	37.8	29000	29000	28900
	450 ppm
	Reduction target (bn. t CO_2,cum)			Reduction costs (trillion US$)			Reduction costs per capita (US$)
Start of reduction measures	BAU	HIGH	LOW	BAU	HIGH	LOW	BAU	HIGH	LOW
2010	540.8	540.9	540.7	27.0	27.0	27.0	20600	20600	20600
2020^a⁾	726.1	727.6	723.2	31.8	31.8	31.6	24300	24300	24200
Source: Ober.heitmann(2010). ^a) Net present value (interest rate = 2.5%).

Starting in 2010, the emission reduction obligations of the Annex-I countries sum up to about 682 bn t CO_2,cumfor the 400 ppm target and 541 bn t CO_2,cumfor the 450 ppm target. Assuming mitigation costs of 50 US$ per tonne of CO₂, this translates into 34 trillion US$ (400 ppm) resp. 27 trillion US$ mitigation costs for all Annex-I countries together. Per capita, these are 20000 – 26000 US$, which is about two to three times the German government reserved as guarantees and government spending for the current international financial crisis. Clearly, early actions of climate change mitigation are preferable. For the 400 ppm CO₂concentration target, the emission reduction requirements of the Annex I countries sum up to an around 27% higher level in 2020 compared to actions starting in 2010. Again, assuming mitigation costs of 50 US$ per tonne of CO₂, this translates into additional 9 trillion US$ total mitigation costs in the tree scenarios for later actions in 2020. Per capita, this is about 7,000 US$ more (Table 12). Allowing for an atmospheric CO₂-concentration of 450 ppm, which represents a higher probability to reach or even to overshoot the 2° C target, the costs of a delay of climate change mitigation measures are even larger than in the 400 ppm case. Here, starting ten years later with the mitigation costs about 34-35% more. However, the total reduction costs and costs per capita are lower than in the 400 ppm case as the CO₂-emission reduction obligations of the Annex I countries are about 16%-21 % smaller.
Long-term, these massive CO₂-emission reductions can only be realised by “negative” emissions, i.e. a combination of renewable energy production (e.g. bio-fuels) or afforestation and a carbon capture and storage (CCS) of fossil fuel emissions. Different approaches are thinkable, inter alia:

a combination of renewable energy production (e.g. bio-fuels) and CCS of the emission from the combustion of these bio-fuels. In this case, the renewable energy production leads to a sequestration of carbon in the biomass (negative emissions) and a capture of the carbon accruing from the combustion of the biomass (zero-emission).
a combination of afforestation (preferably quickly growing biomass) without later logging and CCS of fossil fuel emissions, e.g. from coal combustion for power generation in an integrated gas combined cycle (IGCC).

However, CCS is an expensive option and still in the development stage, even for coal-based power generation. CCS for bio-fuels is even earlier in its development stage. In addition, here, the issue of competition with food crops has to be solved, especially against the background of a growing world population.
In a growing world economy (HIGH), on the one side this is even more difficult to reach these negative emissions as energy demand tends to grow. However, on the other side, only a growing economy provides for sufficient investment capital. A slower growth of the world economy (LOW) would reduce the growth of energy demand, but the economies might be more reluctant to make long-term investments in negative emissions because they might see a trade-off between the investments and economic growth and be worried about the implications on their international competitiveness if there is not a global approach.
However, the proposed new post Kyoto regime also allows for an international emissions trading. If countries did not have reached their limit of cumulated per capita CO₂-emissions, they could sell them to other countries being short of emission rights. The same is for certificates accruing from the other flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. the Clean Development Mechanism (Art. 12), Joint Implementation (Art. 6) and from Land-use, Land-use Change and Forestry (Art. 3,4). Against the background of the problems mentioned before, this would be a more feasible option for the Annex-I countries at least mid-term. Whether the Non-Annex- I countries may agree on that, is a political issue. Currently, they may have emissions rights left which they could sell. However, when their economies are reaching their budget threshold in the future (e.g. China in around 2025), the remaining emission rights are getting scarce.
The approach presented in this article still has certain limits and provides scope for further works. Especially on the data side, the non-CO₂-emissions of the Kyoto protocol (CH₄, N₂O, HFCs, PFCs and SF₆) have to be collected and calculated for all the Non-Annex-I countries. Due to the lack of data, the concept presented here is only based on cumulative CO₂-emissions rather than GHG-emissions. On the mitigation cost side, increasing marginal abatement costs have to be taken into account in a next step. For reasons of simplicity, constant costs are assumed here. In a next step, the analysis of the impact of different paths of GDP of other important Non-Annex-I countries on their obligations in the proposed Post Kyoto regime such as Brazil, South-Africa, Indonesia etc. has to be targeted at.

4. Summary

The principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibility" is one of the cornerstones of sustainable development. It arises from the concept of common heritage and common concern of humankind, and reflects the duty of States of equally sharing the burden of environmental protection for common resources and at the same time takes substantive inequality in the different framework conditions of the single countries into account.
COP 15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 to a large extent failed, because the US and China, together responsible for 40% of global CO₂-emissions, did not come forward with a substantial emission reduction targets. As the US only proposed emission reduction which did not even reach the reduction amount fixed in the Kyoto Protocol 12 years ago, it made it difficult for China to put forward a more substantial target. If these two mega-players do not reach a consensus and take the reluctance of the other as an excuse for an own substantial move, there will be no global success on the mitigation of global climate change. Against this background, a new cooperative climate regime is necessary to meet the World’s energy and environmental problems. COP 17 in Durban brought about a general international agreement on a post Kyoto regime, which, however has to be filled with life until 2015 and will come into effect in 2020.
The currently discussed approaches of post Kyoto regimes have a common weakness that at the same time (a) theydo not acknowledge the historical responsibilities of the industrialized countries for the historical greenhouse gas emissions and the responsibility of developing countries for a large fraction of the future emissions, and (b) they do not provide for a fair distribution of emissions.
Taking the current shortcomings into account, an alternative climate regime proposed in this paper is based on cumulative CO₂-emissions taking the historical emissions into account and being in line with the principle of "Common, but Differentiated Responsibilities". In absolute terms, the Annex-I countries currently represent 74.8% of the world cumulative CO₂-emissions, the OECD countries 63.4%. The Non-Annex-I countries are only responsible for 25.2% of the cumulated emissions, of which China represent 9.2% points. However, by 2007, with 119.7 bn CO_2,cum, China, already almost exceeded the cumulative CO₂-emissions of Germany (85.1 bn t CO_2,cum) and France (35.5 bn t CO_2,cum) together.
By dividing CO_2-concemtration of 400 ppm (450 ppm) in atmosphere equivalent to a stabilisation of global warming to 2°C through the world population in 2007, the new regime allocates 247 (355) t CO_2,cumas an allowed amount to for each individual of a country in the world. To provide for an incentive to reduce CO₂inabsolute terms, the 2007 world population of 6.5 bn. is taken for the specific target. This means, growing CO₂-emissions cannot be compensated by a growing population, but provide an incentive for climate change mitigation measures.
Figure 1 shows the development of the cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita in the three scenarios. Taking the threshold of 247 t CO_2,cumper capita (400 ppm) resp. 355 t CO_2,cumper capita (450 ppm) as a yardstick, it is quite obvious that the industrialized countries have exceeded their emission budget per capita by far. In 2007, the US citizens consumed 1218 t CO_2,cumper capita, the Germans 1035 CO_2,cumper capita, far above the average of the OECD average (688 CO_2,cumper capita). In 2007, China only consumed 91 t CO_2,cumper capita.

Figure 1:
Cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita in different scenarios of GDP growth
(t per capita, 2010-2050)

BAU	HIGH
LOW

Source: Own calculations.
In the BAU-scenario, worldwide, the 400 ppm threshold is reached by 2015, the 450 ppm threshold by 2031. According to the simulations, China has to stabilise its cumulative CO₂-emissions on the 2026 level (400 ppm) resp. 2035 (450 ppm).. On the average, all Non-Annex-I countries will reach this target by 2045. In the HIGH scenario of economic growth, China will reach the 400 ppm threshold by 2025, the 450 ppm threshold by 2034 (worldwide: 400 ppm by 2015, 450 ppm by 2031). In the LOW-scnenario, worldwide, 400 ppm will be reached by 2016, 450 ppm by 2033. China’s cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita will reach the 247 t CO_2,cumlevel (400 ppm) by 2028, the 355 t CO_2,cumlevel (450 ppm) by 2038.
The Annex-I countries, however, already exceeded their budgets by far. They have to reduce their cumulated CO₂-emissions per capita to their 1950 level instead of facing a further increase.
To implement such as system, political hurdles have to be overcome. As earlier indicated by den Elzen, Lucas and Vuuren (2005), a cumulative emission approach provides a larger financial burden for the Annex-I countries. The fear of negative implications for the domestic industry may be reasonable. However, the private investments in green energy may also provide for a considerable increase in employment in these countries. In addition, the global financial crisis showed that governments are also willing to spend huge amounts of finance to mitigate their negative impacts. For reasons of simplicity, constant CO₂-emission reduction costs are assumed. Marginal abatement cost curves for all 70 countries are not available to this point of time and mark need for further research. Assuming constant CO₂-emission reduction costs of 50 US$ per ton, the mitigation of climate change for the Annex-I countries would be costly, about 34 trillion US$ (400 ppm) resp. 27 trillion US$. Per capita, however, these are between 20000 and 26000 US$, about two to three times, e.g. the German government reserved as guarantees and government spending for the current international financial crisis. Investments of 20000 and 26000 US$ per capita on a time scale of 40 years means 515-650 US$ per year or 43-54 US$ per month for every Annex-I country inhabitant.
Early action to mitigate climate change is of the essence. A delay of climate change mitigation measures of only ten years after 2010 would increase the mitigation costs for the Annex I countries by around 30%. A delay of action would also increase the probability of accelerating CO₂-emissions from triggered feedbacks not considered in earlier models, such as release of methane trapped under melting permafrost, acidification of oceans, etc. (Worldwatch Institute, 2009).
Technically, the Annex-I countries can achieve their emission reduction targets only through a combination of bio-fuels or a sustainable afforestation and CCS. However, CCS is still in its technical development stage. The alternative is a global emission trading scheme which allows countries with surplus emission rights to sell them to other countries lacking these rights (Oberheitmann, 2010). Such as global emission trading scheme, however is politically sensitive as in the future, developing countries such as China may face a scarcity of emission rights. Such a post-Kyoto regime may also provide incentives to bank emission right which can be used in the future. Countries with large foreign exchange reserves such as China may be well advised to do so.

References

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[1] Only up to 1964. As from 1965, bunkers were included in the data of primary energy consumption of BP (2008).

+ Prof. Andreas Oberheitmann, Ph.D., Director of the Research Center for International Environmental Policy (RCIEP), School of Environment, Tsinghua University, Beijing and Senior Research Fellow at the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen. Address: Tsinghua University, Sino-Italian Energy Efficiency Building, Room 1004, Haidian District, 100084 Beijing, China. E-Mail: oberheitmann@tsinghua.edu.cn. Tel: 0086-10-6279.-4115, Ext. 8002.

[1] 1995 can be optionally taken as the baseline year for HFCs, PFCs, and SF₆(Art. 3,8).

[2] Members of the Committee are Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Water Resources, State Forestry Administration, Chinese Academy of Science, State Ocean Administration, Civil Aviation Administration.

[3] An Annex-I country (i.e., an OECD country or an East or Central European country in transition) wishing to get credits from a CDM project must obtain the consent of the developing country hosting the project that the project will contribute to its sustainable development. Then, in a Project Design Document (PDD), using baseline and monitoring methodologies approved by the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB), the Annex-I country has to prove that the project activity and the incurring greenhouse gas emission reductions would not have happened anyway (establishing additionality), and must establish a baseline (the business as usual case) enabling him to estimate the future emissions in absence of the registered project. The project is then validated by a third party agency, called Designated Operational Entity (DOE). The function of the DOE is to ensure and certify that the project results in real, measurable, and long-term emission reductions. The EB then decides whether or not to register (approve) the project. If a project is registered and implemented, the CDM EB issues credits, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), each unit equivalent to the reduction of one metric tonne of CO₂. These CERs are issued to the project participants based on the monitored difference between the baseline and the actually monitored emissions, verified by the DOE.