Josef Baum：Contested issues on implementation of principles of CBDR

2014-03-06 10:24:01 来源: 作者: 【大中小】浏览:2075次评论:0条

Josef Baum[1]
Preliminary conference version

One of the sparse positive result of the Copenhagen-Accord was that all countries professed that the IPCC target of maximum temperature change of +2° for the 21st century should not be exceeded. The point often forgotten isthe scientific forecast that transcending this threshold will trigger irreversible and uncontrollable dynamics. So there is a relatively short window of opportunity of about the next 15 years to keep climate change still controllable.
The +2° C target has a strong implication: this means that only a certain amount of greenhouse gases (~1.100 billion t CO2-equivalents 1990 – 2050) can be emitted. It remains „only“ a distribution problem of this volume (burden sharing).

CBDR is the general magic formula. “Common but differentiated responsibility” was agreed by the international community in Rio 1992 and was again approved in the Rio+20 conference 2012. Together with "contracting and converging" of greenhouse gases this essential achievement of Rio92became central for the documents of IPCC and UNFCCC.
But operationalization by effective solutions has not happened until now. The general missing link would be not more than the acknowledgement of “equal rights”; to be more precisely: for all currently living peopleand also the next generations.Why there is fear of “equal rights”?

At Rio+20 CBDR contested especially by the USA, but also the EUwanted to cancel it. But at the end it was not only reaffirmed but also re-defined, in the context that “eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge. And in addition to responsibilities also „respective capabilities“ were mentioned. So in fact „CBDRRC“ is still more adequately.

But why USA and EU do not like CBDR(RC)? But the Kyoto-Treaty was a first small step in realization of CBDRRC, especially in accepting different categories of countries. The EU implements the "20-20-20" targets also by a differentiated burden sharing (“effort sharing” sounds more positive) within EU-countries basically along a principle of CBDR. One reason for the cautious position for the EU on the global level is because some fear the dissemination of this principle to other fields of international policy. Additionally CBDR(RC) is not limited to global issues but useful for different levels – and different problems.

Why there is fear of “equal rights”? Vested interests prefer “grandfathering”. The “grandfathering” strategy is also implemented in the Kyoto treaty on the basis of reduction rates of very different base levels and does not recognizes the development issues and the historic realities. The “Brazil proposal” on the other side considered the historical emissions per capita and takes account comprehensive responsibility. But thereare dozens of specific concepts of "equality" –and even more of "fairness”. So progress can be made by agreeing firstly on basic principles.

An important step forward would be the anchoring of the +2° C target and CBDR(RC) in public international law together withthe acknowledgement of “equal rights”on the atmosphere.

共同但有区别责任原则争议探讨
约瑟夫•鲍姆

        哥本哈根会议上，所有国家达成共识，认可了政府间气候变化专门委员会关于21世纪最高升温不得超过2摄氏度的目标，这是本次会议为数不多的积极成果。另外，科学预测表明，超过该临界值将会带来不可逆转、不可控制的剧烈变动。在这一情况下，在未来15年内，将气候变化局势保持在可控情况，面临着相对严峻的考验。该目标包含着深刻的隐喻：为保证目标的达成，在1990年到2050年，只有约11亿吨二氧化碳当量的温室气体被允许排放。因此，该排放指标的分配，成为了一个重要而敏感的问题。
        共同但有区别责任原则首现于1992年里约大会，并于2012年的里约+20大会上重申。该重要成果成为了联合国气候变化框架公约以及政府间气候变化专门委员会规范文件的重要内容。然而遗憾的是，就该原则的操作化尝试至今未取得重大进展。
        在里约+20大会上，美国和欧盟对共同但有区别责任原则提出了反对。但最后，该原则仍然被确认、并被重新明确。会议文件中明确指出，由于消除贫穷依旧是世界面临的重要问题，在承担责任的大小方面，不同的经济能力和发展需求应当被强调。所以，共同但有区别责任原则在当前环境下仍然适用。
        然则，为何美国、欧盟并不支持该原则？必须指出，在执行“20-20-20”目标时，欧盟对其内部国家适用区别负担的原则，这说明了欧盟在一定范围内、一定程度上对共同但有区别责任原则的认可。之所以在国际环境下，对该原则报以如此谨慎的态度，原因或在于该原则与其他国际政策的结合宣传、可能造成一定问题。
        在该原则的理解方面，对于发展问题和历史排放的考虑有着重要意义。在“巴西提议”中，就人均历史排放之概念进行了考虑，并将之融入综合责任内涵之内。总之，对于公平、公正的理解方式有很多，采取不同的理解方式，可能发生不同的原则执行结果。对该原则的主张、提倡，不可盲目。

The issue of sustainable development is to be reframed by the necessities to react globally to climate change. The fundamentally new: There are "deadlines" for the solution to the climate issue, becoming an existential question of humanity. The latter mankind starts with effective mitigating the more there will be sacrifices.[2]The former we start we can minimize harm und increase positive effects. So these „deadlines“ will create fundamental pressure for global solutions. And there must be simultaneous solutions, not only for climate change but also for development and overcoming poverty and security of resources

But why until now we do not see an effective global climate mitigation policy? What are the reasons why burden sharing (effort sharing) of global mitigation of climate change up till now is not solved? The issues are on the agenda of the Post-Copenhagen-process. The global solution requires the inclusion of almost all countries. Since the Rio-conference 1992 the phrasing “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR) has been adopted but obviously is interpreted quite differently.

Methodological approach of this paper is:

Overview: summarizing some dozens of articles with different concepts of equity
Selective analysis of historical basics of climate change and distribution on different levels
Identification and comparisons of principles of equity in climate change policy

One of the sparse positive result of the Copenhagen-Accord was that all countries professed that the IPCC target of maximum temperature change of +2° for the 21st century should not be exceeded. The point often forgotten isthe scientific forecast that transcending this threshold will trigger irreversible and uncontrollable dynamics. So there is a relatively short window of opportunity of about the next 15 years to keep climate change still controllable.
The +2° C target has a strong implication: this means that only a certain amount of greenhouse gases (~1.100 billion t CO2-equivalents 1990 – 2050) can be emitted. It remains „only“ a distribution problem of this volume (burden sharing).

Distribution problems are based on concepts of equity. CBDR is close to a general magic formula for a general implementation of the equity principle. “Common but differentiated responsibility” was agreed by the international community in Rio 1992 and was again approved in the Rio+20 conference 2012. Together with "contracting and converging" of greenhouse gases this essential achievement of Rio 92 became central for the documents of IPCC and UNFCCC.

Concepts like “global but differentiated responsibility” or "contracting and converging" are found in the documents of IPCC and UNFCCC since the beginning. But almost all the details in the process of burden sharing are open and evidently these are the greatest obstacles for the start of an effective global climate policy or the after-Kyoto process at all.

The topical IPCC document states: “All sorts of climate change policies related to vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation will have impacts on intra- and intergenerational equity. These equity impacts apply at the global, international, regional, national and sub-national levels. Article 3 of the UNFCCC (1992, sometimes referred to as ‘the equity article’) states that Parties should protect the climate system on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. Numerous approaches exist in the climate change discourse on how these principles can be implemented.“[3]

Burden sharing of climate change completely unsolved. The logic of the process seems to be: there will comprehensive solutions for some fundamental problems implicating global convergence and cohesion.

“Social welfare functions and other value functions, when applied to the assessment of the costs and benefits of global climate change policies, run into a number of crucial equity questions. These include issues that are related to the asymmetry between the concentration of major GHG emission sources in industrialized countries and the relatively large expected damages in developing countries, the treatment of individuals with different income levels in the social welfare function, and a number of inter-generational issues.”[4]

The international negotiations are focussed on the distribution between countries. This is determined by the structure of institutions. But if there will be any substantial results in burden sharing anyway then under the actual circumstances possibly this could result in transfers from the more poor in the industrialized countries to the more rich in the developing countries. So not only the level of distribution between states has to be seen but also the comprehensive global (personal) distribution.
The equity problems by climate change are set worldwide, but also on all other levels: local, regional, national, continental.

Within the Kyoto-process there are binding obligations only for industrialized countries. Binding obligations for developing are most contested area. But developing countries probably will join only on the basis of equity and equality. “Fairness” in this sense puts the questions on the “historical responsibility” of the accumulation of greenhouse gases (because e.g. CO2 remains in the atmosphere more than 100 years)

Historical Responsibility has a long agenda in the history of UNFCCC[5]. Concepts like "global but differentiated responsibility" or "contracting and converging" are found in the documents of IPCC and UNFCCC since the beginning. But almost all the details in the process of burden sharing are open and evidently these are the greatest hurdles for the start of an effective global climate policy or the after-Kyoto process at all.

As mentioned we see globally and generally socially differentiated emissions per capita. But additionally to these axes there is the time axis. And both directions of the time axis, backward and forward, are important for “fairness” calculations. So the already complex global distribution is enriched by the distribution between generations. Former generations had or had not consumed fossil energy and created capital and infrastructure.

One of the most disputed fields[6]is the measurement of future values for future generations: Via discount rates (" time preference rate"), future values are transformed to present values: Discount rates are used for eva luating future harms or positive effects. The extension of discount rates is derived from “market”, and is often assumed in practical terms in cost-benefit analysesas high as the average profit rates of about 5-6%. But discount rates, which are not close to zero, deva lue future values (positive or negative values) beyond the immediate next few years or decades to a value close to zero.

The historical dimension, the integration of historical responsibility (and foreseeable development) would be still more complicated if not only the costs for mitigation would be considered but also adaptation and the issues of vulnerability and risk.

From the beginning of industrialisation from the 19^thcentury (in Britain from the end of the 18^thcentury) there is significant correlation and co-evolution between

The emergence of industrialization
global asymmetrical accumulation of capital (and infrastructure “capital”, "human resources", "social capital")[7]
(Industrial) use of fossil energy and
CO2-emissionsand other greenhouse gases, and thus the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the commons of the atmosphere[8]

Fortunately for the calculation of practical schemes the historical dimension (backward) is correlated with the emission of CO2 pc, with the some exceptions like late starting emerging countries with high growth rates (like China or Asian "tigers”).

Unfortunately in the literature on climate change the basic equity issues are treated to a small degree; and even when all the distributional issues are treated only seldom the comprehensive and historical view can be found. There are exceptions[9], which could be the basis of a global convergence[10]resulting in effective climate policy.

In global policy operationalization of CBDRby effective solutions has not happened until now. The general missing link would be not more than the acknowledgement of “equal rights”; to be more precisely: for all currently living peopleand also the next generations. Why there is fear of “equal rights”?

At Rio+20 CBDR contested especially by the USA, but also the EU wanted to cancel it. But at the end it was not only reaffirmed but also re-defined, in the context that “eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge. And in addition to responsibilities also „respective capabilities“ were mentioned. So in fact „CBDRRC“ is still more adequately.

But why USA and EU do not like CBDR(RC)? But the Kyoto-Treaty was a first small step in realization of CBDRRC, especially in accepting different categories of countries. The EU implements the "20-20-20" targets also by a differentiated burden sharing (“effort sharing” sounds more positive) within EU-countries basically along a principle of CBDR. One reason for the cautious position for the EU on the global level is because some fear the dissemination of this principle to other fields of international policy. Additionally CBDR(RC) is not limited to global issues but useful for different levels – and different problems.

Fundamental principles of equity
In the fundamentally blocked process of global climate policy positions differ in such a huge degree that it seems useful to agree on basic principles, which hardly could be separated from ethical values.

There is some discussion whether basic principles for feasible solutions for climate policy should be simple or more sophisticated. The argument for the simple is that agreements on simple principles seem more probable; the argument for the sophisticated is that reality is complex, and the scheme should fit to very different circumstances.

There are at least some dozens of different concepts for equity and fairness in climate policy. E. g. the Bush administration advocated the principle of equal carbon intensity per unit of GDP. In the following there is some overview with highlights and first trials to categorize the principles:

In a heuristic approach the starting points for the view of equality and fairness in connection with the climate change can come e. g. from:

ethical moral reasons,
obligations from international documents,
concepts of the sustainable development.
Or from the fact that necessary international contracts simply will not come into being otherwise

Basically we can see

procedural,
cost oriented or
outcome based

definitions of equity and fairness.

Principles of procedural equity and fairness would be:

Market mechanism
Willingness to pay
auction
consent (can mean very different: from discretionary to fixed rules)

It seems usefully to approach to distributional aspects from more basic principles: Fundamental principles of distribution can be e. g. – (pre-scientific/political/ethical):

Parity
Proportionality
Priority

Oxfam uses three principles:

Fairness,
capability,
simplicity

CICERO-ECZ mainly stress

“guilt”,
capacity und
need

For each possible principle there can be found again different indicators for measurement. (The problems of indicators will not be dealt here).

Other factors besides emissions will be relevant for concrete solutions. For instance natural resource endowments or higher heating bills because of geography probably are relevant.

Anyway there are a lot of complex questions like how to integrate „land use changes“ or how to integrate sinks of GHGes.

But also within some categories we see quite a lot of different sub-categories: E. g. „Efficiency“ targets:

Equal CO2-emissions per unit GDP
Equal marginal mitigation costs
Mitigation costs in proportion to emissions per unit of GDP

„Grandfathering“ is very important because it is aligned to existing distribution, in the only real process (Kyoto) is designed along this principle: but there are also very different possibilities:

Equality of absolute CO2-reductions per capita (could be negative at poor countries, therefore logically not possible)
Equality of relative CO2-reductions per capita (for industrial countries - Kyoto),
Equal proportion of reductions in relation to historical accumulation of emissions
“Ability to pay”: equal proportion in mitigation costs/GDP
Outcome based, “horizontal”: Equal net welfare change (equal proportion of GDP)
compensation for net-loosing countries: “No nation should be made worse off”

A special category would be grandfathering with „minimum securing“, like

Rawls - Maximin (Maximization of lower incomes within the existing environment)
“No purchase“: poor countries get CO2-certificate without payment within a basis scenario
„No harm“: No costs for more poor countries

The political foundation of democracies would be “Equal Rights” (for the atmosphere), again with various different forms:

“Outcome based – vertical”:

(Net)gains inverted to GDP, losses proportional to GDP

Egalitarian: Equal right for pollution (per capita) – territorial:

This is the position of the G-77. Here the date of convergence has to be fixed

Egalitarian:Equal right for pollution (per capita) – functional:

Trade – net is considered. Compare the comprehensive view of the „ecological footprint
This would be some extended polluter pays principle. We ask: Production (incl. emissions) for whom (not : where). Note:“Net exports (in China) accounted for 23 % of China´s total CO2 emissions.”[11]

Egalitarian: causal historicalresponsibility for greenhouse gas emissions – territorial

Former economic and ecological asymmetric distributions are integrated.This is the “Brazil proposal” within the UNFCCC - MATCH-process(In the context of the Kyoto process Brazil made a proposal which aims at differentiated emission reduction after accounting the sums of the historical contributions of greenhouse gas emissions by various countries.

Egalitarian: causal historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions – functional

Clearing up of trade – net. Historical polluter pays principle. Production (incl. emissions) for whom (not : where)

Egalitarian:Equal right for pollution (per capita) – control view

Rights of property and power of decision are considered. Who controls the value added? Example: 58% of Chinese exports are controlled by transnational companies.

Egalitarian:Equal right for pollution (per capita) – control viewfor the whole viewed era -historical

The question would be: Who has had the property and disposal rights also in previous time periods? The historical world-system theory (Wallerstein) approach can be used as the background for asymmetric accumulation of capital and similarly asymmetric emissions of pollutants.

First results show high amounts of redistribution

Gruebler-Nakicenovic[12]presented one of the first scenarios with various emission allocation rules (with distributive aspects) in the nineties. 13 regions of the world by 2050 were regarded with the focus on the principle of "Equal emission right person".
These calculations and also the following similar ones showed very high amounts of redistribution along the principle of equal emission right for each person.

Calculations are also possible on the global personal level. See e.g. Baer along world regions und quintiles of income within the regions: The upper two quintiles in the USA would have a need for redistribution of some 144 billion $.[13]
Boyce-Riddle[14]calculated for US deciles of households budgetary expenditure on food, services, electricity, fuel, other modes of transport and industrial goods, and corresponding CO2 emissions per capita for the year 2003. A limit to the total emission (“Cap”) is defined, and this limit can be gradually reduced according to climate goals. On the other side CO2 taxes are levied, which will be collected at producers (as the production is concentrated, it is an effective approach). The revenue is to be placed in a fund "Sky Trust". Equal rights implicate per capita emissions. Those that are under the threshold emission limit receive net disbursements. The results are net monetary benefits for the first six deciles, with by far the greatest benefit to the bottom decile.
The basic scheme (the emission limitation, the egalitarian distribution of the burden, and the monetary transfer to the low emitters) of this allocation of resources can be achieved at different levels from the regional to a global level.

An hypothetical example shall show the dimensions: In the USA some (now) 5 % (300 millions) of the world population have been responsible for roughly 20% emissions till now (if only CO₂is considered it would be much more as mentioned). If we assume that in the future there will be the same amount of entire global emission like in last 50 years and the USA would emit zero as long as the cannot reach their “just” (world average) share on the total amount of historical global emissions – the USA would have to stay around 150 years in the status of zero-emission to reach the 5 % emission share. – In analogy for Europe this Zero-emission status would be some 50 years.

But the calculation on the basis of nations does not regard the unequal intra-nation disparities – as mentioned.
Because a strict moratorium is hypothetical some global regulations on far-reaching compensations are realistic solutions for which still much socio-economic and socio-ecologic research is to be done.

General conclusions

Why there is fear of “equal rights”? Vested interests prefer “grandfathering”. The “grandfathering” strategy is also implemented in the Kyoto treaty on the basis of similar reduction rates for very different base levels. “Grandfathering” does not recognize the development issues and the historic realities. The “Brazil proposal” on the other side considered the historical emissions per capita and takes account comprehensive responsibility. But thereare dozens of specific concepts of "equality" –and even more of "fairness”. So progress can be made by agreeing firstly on basic principles.

Equity issues inextricably are linked with climate change policy:

The expected harms by climate change will be huge also for developed countries in the mid and long run so that it does not matter if these harms are relatively less to developing countries.
There will be big and comprehensive solutions for many fundamental issues - or there will be no solutions. A fair solution for costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation could implicate global convergence and cohesion.

Specific Conclusion

An important step forward would be the anchoring of the +2° C target and CBDR(RC) in public international law together withthe acknowledgement of “equal rights”on the atmosphere.

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[1]University of Vienna - Department for East Asian Studies
M: +43 664 1142298 www.josefbaum.at

[2]In the following the well-known Stern report is cited although there could be much criticism on methodology: “…the Review leads to a simple conclusion: the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting. Climate change will affect the basic elements of life for people around the world – access to water, food production, health, and the environment. Hundreds of millions of people could suffer hunger, water shortages and coastal flooding as the world warms. Using the results from formal economic models, the Review estimates that if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more. In contrast, the costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – can be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year. The investment that takes place in the next 10-20 years will have a profound effect on the climate in the second half of this century and in the next. Our actions now and over the coming decades could create risks of major disruption to economic and social activity, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half”. Stern Review. Summary and Conclusions p. vi

[3]IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA., p. 145f

[4]IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA., p. 146

[5]Friman M.(2007): Historical Responsibility in the UNFCCC. Centre for climate and Policy Research

[6]See the discussions on Stern

[7]„Inequality of world distribution of income worsened from the beginning of the 19^th century to World War II and after that seems to have stabilized or to have grown more slowly. In the early 19^th century most inequality was due to differences within countries; later, it was due to differences between countries.“Bourguignon, F., Morrisson, C. (1999): Inequality among World Citizens, 1820 – 1990. American Economic Review (September 2002): p. 727

[8]Compare: Nicolas Stern delivered also the conclusion“Climate change is the greatest market failure the world has ever seen”.

[9]Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung – globale Umweltveränderungen (2009): Kassensturz für den Weltklimavertrag – der Budgetansatz. Berlin

[10]Pan Jiahua, Chen Ying (2010): Carbon budget proposal: A framework for an equitable and sustainable international climate regime. Social Sciences in China. Vol 31, No.1.Beijing. P.5-34

[11]Watson J., Tao Wang, Is the west to blame for China’s emissions? December 20, 2007 http://www.chinadialogue.net
CO₂ emissions from China’s net exports in 2004 in comparison to other countries’ total emissions
“A number of other studies have been conducted, some of which reach similar conclusions. A report in 2005 by Bin Shui, of the US National Centre for Atmospheric Research, indicated that 7% to 14% of China's CO₂ emissions in the period from 1997 to 2003 were due to exports to the US alone. Jiang Kejun of the Energy Research Institute, which is based in the Chinese government’s National Development and Reform Commission, suggestsexports account for around 20% of China’s total national energy consumption.
These results are inevitably subject to uncertainties and simplifications, not least because of a lack of data on the carbon intensity of different exported products. However, the implications are clear. The extent of “exported carbon” from China should lead to a re-think by government negotiators working towards a new climate-change agreement beyond 2012.”

[12]Grübler A, Nakicenovic (1994): International Burden Sharing in Greenhouse Gas Reduction, IIASA, 1994

[13]Baer, P. (2006): Adaptation: Who pays whom? In: Adger W.N., J. Paavola, S. Hug and M. J. Mace (eds.) (2006): Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change. – Cambridge, Mass, p. 148

[14]Boyce, J.K.; Riddle M. (2007): Cap and Dividend: How to Curb Global Warming While Protecting the Incomes of American Families, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Working Paper Series Number 150